Security Council’s
resolution and Saharawi need for self-evaluation
By: Malainin Lakhal
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UN Security Council resolution 1920[2010], which
was adopted last April 30, highlights the UN’s failure to solve the
conflict of Western Sahara despite all of the analysis and political
excuses and arguments that we have heard, or may hear, which are mere
attempts to soften the impact of such a resolution. And of course the
two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, both
welcomed the new resolution in an attempt to score some points at the
level of the media struggle facing them, but also for moral reasons.
Nonetheless, the resolution didn’t bring anything new (especially not
to the Saharawi party) and was a poor reproduction of the previous
resolutions.
But before commenting on the resolution, we should try first to
dismantle the main points it raises, far from any kind of provocation
or attempt to distort its positive points - if there are any- or its
negative aspects on the Saharawi issue as a case of decolonisation
still unachieved since 1963.
Where danger
lies
It is true that the resolution states that the Security Council
reaffirms “its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just,
lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide
for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the
context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of
the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and
responsibilities of the parties in this respect”, but also, and to
conform to pressure from the French, the text followed the same path as
the latest resolutions by trying to deviate the conflict from its legal
repertoire, which is, it should be recalled, decolonisation. The
resolution, in fact, adopted the same old formula of expressing the
Council’s welcome of “the commitment of the parties to continue the
process of negotiations through the United Nations-sponsored talks”,
and at the same time recalling “its endorsement of the recommendation
in the report of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251) that realism and a spirit
of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in
negotiations.”
So, with regard to the political core of the problem, the UN is still
playing the same old game of procrastination, by maintaining the status
quo, if not leaning towards support for the French/Moroccan parties,
who tirelessly work to legitimize the illegal Moroccan occupation of
Western Sahara via the attempted imposition of the so-called “autonomy
plan” on the Saharawi people and the perpetuation of the conflict while
working harder to dismantle the Saharawi resistance, tear it apart, and
disperse it as in the Palestinian experience. This is what the Moroccan
secret services work on – targeting the Saharawi refugee camps and
Saharawi communities in Mauritania, Spain and elsewhere in an attempt
to infiltrate the Saharawi national corps to destroy it from inside and
to break its unity with any possible, dirty maneuvers.
Human rights..
the blow that doesn’t kill you may makes you stronger
With respect to human rights, the resolution adopted very hazy language
that is open to several different interpretations just so the text
would be adopted, especially because France has blatantly opposed any
wording that would hold Morocco accountable for its human rights
violations in Western Sahara and any extension of the mandate of the UN
mission on the ground, MINURSO, to include the monitoring and
protection of human rights. France, the cradle of human rights and
liberties, succeeded indeed in imposing its will even in choosing the
term “Human dimension” instead of using the internationally used term
“human rights”.
France completely isolated itself inside the Security Council, since it
stood alone in defending Morocco, while the majority of the members of
the Council expressed dissatisfaction over Paris’s refusal to permit
the incorporation of the protection of human rights in MINURSO’s
mandate. It became obvious, then, that the Saharawi people are not only
facing the Moroccan expansionist occupation, but also the French state,
which refuses to let the UN implement international law in an
internationally recognized case of decolonisation.
On the other hand, it can be said that the Security Council’s latest
resolution was a heavy blow to the Saharawi people, since the Council
didn’t “take note” of the peaceful struggle and the sacrifices of the
different Saharawi bodies, from the smallest students’ demonstrations
in the occupied zones of Western Sahara to the multiple battles waged
by the Saharawi human rights defenders during 2009 and in previous
years; not to forget the many letters sent by the President of the
Saharawi Republic, Mohamed Abdelaziz, to all international
organizations, in addition to all press releases and reports by
international human rights organizations that give undeniable proof of
the accountability of the regime of Mohamed VI for the oppression and
state terrorism exercised in a systematic way against the Saharawis to
force them to bow down to his authority. All these national and
international efforts, international campaigns, letters and press
releases didn’t help in forcing the UN to assume its responsibilities
towards this conflict.
On the other hand, one must recognize that this international pressure,
the work of the human rights defenders, and the sacrifices of the
Saharawi people forced many people to face difficult choices and pushed
the British representative in the Security Council, for example, to
face France on the issue of human rights during the debates preceding
the adoption of the resolution. These efforts also pushed the rest of
the members of the Security Council - especially Nigeria, Uganda,
Mexico, Austria and Brazil – to openly criticize the way the so-called
“unanimity” in the adoption of the resolution has been reached, since
only the permanent members of the Security Council plus Spain - or the
famous club of the “friends of Western Sahara” - participated in the
final redaction of the resolution.
But, we should also consider that this resolution, with all that it
represents of detriments to human rights because of the French
position, may help in gathering real and bigger support to the Saharawi
cause this year if the Saharawis and their allies and supporters
succeed to put more and more pressure by using this significant card
and the probable support from international organizations, to whom this
resolution is a real slap to the face and a failure of their often
“balanced” reports and “moderate” pressure.
Nonetheless, the Saharawi party must reconsider the way it operates and
runs this issue. Saharawis must understand that they have failed to
coordinate and exploit all of these international efforts and pressure
put forth by important organizations such as Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, the Robert F. Kennedy Foundation, Front Line and
others, and that they have usually played the role of the spectator, or
at best reacted to events instead of creating and supervising them.
The Saharawi
response
Many people, both Saharawis and non Saharawis, argued that the
responses of the Saharawi political leadership to the UN Secretary
General’s report and to the Security Council’s resolution were
insufficient. Despite the fact that they succeeded in focusing on
France to isolate it and show it as the real problem and rival of the
Saharawi people, the few official responses expressed were very mild
and tried in many cases to give false interpretations to the words and
terms in the resolution to come up with false victories. Thus we can
certainly not agree with the Saharawi leadership’s reading, though we
oppose any kind of pessimism and though we do understand how hard the
struggle is.
It is true that we do not have first-hand facts and information as this
leadership may have, but as interested observers we think that the
majority of people had long ago understood that the UN and its actual
approach to the conflict under Chapter VI of its Charter (recognizing
that it is trying to violate this Charter through “realism and spirit
of compromise”) will only lead to autonomy no matter what be the final
formula of this “solution” that France pushes with all its influence,
the US doesn’t really oppose and Spain thinks can end the Moroccan
blackmailing.
After the strong letter sent last April 14 by the President of the
Saharawi government to Ban Ki-Moon, Saharawis felt that their
leadership had finally listened to their opinions and expressed some of
their anger and protest. The letter was followed by the Saharawi
foreign ministry’s statement one day after declaring the Saharawi
decision to reconsider the relation with MINURSO if it fails to fulfill
its real mandate. Perhaps concrete steps were also adopted on the
ground to give proof of the Saharawi determination to implement this
decision, but we were all surprised later by statements that hinted at
the possible retraction of acting upon these threats. Here we must
stress that after threats of such actions, if the Saharawi leadership
is really going to pull out without convincing reasons, it will cost
the Saharawis a lot of their much-needed credibility.
Security
“If it is impossible to avoid death.. then it would be shameful to die
as a coward”
The impression we give to others by repeating “threats” with no
effective actions to follow is really undermining the Saharawi image,
and thus this attitude must stop because it is useless and will only
harm our credibility. Rather, why not adopt real and methodical steps
that can help in rebuilding this credibility and can send effective
messages that reflects the bitterness and anger raging in Saharawis’
hearts everywhere? And there are many steps that can be adopted
starting with stopping any kind of “positive” and “kind” collaboration
with MINURSO as a representative of the UN, because the role of the
“responsive” and “good boy” we have been playing for decades has
clearly not paid off. And this is not an accusation against MINURSO,
nor is it a denial of their rights as individuals, But as a UN mission,
it doesn’t deserve any kind of respect from the Saharawis since it has
not only insolently failed to meet its duty of organizing the
referendum, but also failed to protect and monitor human rights. And
worse, in many cases former members of this mission became agents of
the Moroccan ministry of the interior through participation as zealous
members of suspicious lobbying firms on Rabat’s payroll.
On the other hand, Saharawis should not continue to threaten to resume
war unless they are really going there. I strongly believe that
Saharawis do not need to resume war to liberate Western Sahara if they
meet one condition: a real, sincere and strict reevaluation of their
movement to reform and to remedy the many defects they have, not only
in the administration of our affairs, but also in their vision that is
becoming more unclear and perhaps, to an extent, not sufficiently
unified. That said, it should be clear that without this internal
review there is no possibility to talk about success in the Saharawi
struggle with or without war. There is no use of war if Saharawis are
unable to exploit its results in their favour. But in the end, if there
is no other way but resuming the legitimate armed struggle to achieve
the liberation, then why not?
The need for a
stand with the self
It is high time for the Saharwis to ask the right questions to evaluate
the choices they have made for the last two decades of successes and
failures in their struggle. What have they realized and what have they
failed to achieve? How did they succeed in unifying the generations on
the same level of understanding and readiness to fight? Did they really
succeed in this? How successful were they in making the most of their
national human resources? And what are the obstacles that may have
hindered this exploitation? Further, what do they really want, and why
not follow new methods to realizing what they want if the old ways
failed? What are the obstacles that hindered the best use of their
resources? What are the real challenges the Moroccan invaders put on
the ground? And what the Saharawis have done to face them?
The questions that can help improve the vision are easy to find, while
hesitating to face them and thinking that playing the waiting game is
in the Saharawis’ favour, or that it is against the Moroccans only, is
an incorrect evaluation, as time is playing against everyone, and may
well affect the Saharawis’ aspirations if they fail to protect them.
Meanwhile, hesitating to find remedy to the defects in the Saharawi
body will certainly affect its “unity” and “strength” - two factors
that are needed now more than ever.
Finally, Saharawis must understand and be convinced that the solution
of the conflict of Western Sahara will not be given by the UN, US or
France; rather, it is the Saharawi people themselves who hold the tools
to achieve victory. So how can the Saharawi militants or friends and
supporters of the Saharawis, make this victory quick and with the
minimum number of casualties? This is another question that we need all
to answer... and quickly.
Malainin Lakhal
Secretary General of the Saharawi Journalists and Writers Union
URL: http://www.upes.org
Saharawi refugee camps
11/05/2010
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