UNITED NATIONS
Security Council ,
S/1995/986 ,
24 November 1995
1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security
Council resolution 1017 (1995) of 22 September 1995. In paragraph 4
of that resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General, in
close consultation with the parties, to produce specific and detailed
proposals to resolve the problems hindering the completion of the
identification process in the framework of its relevant resolutions,
in particular resolution 907 (1994) of 29 March 1994 relating to the
compromise proposal of the Secretary-General (S/26185), and
resolution 1002 (1995) of 30 June 1995 relating to he recommendations
of the Security Council mission (S/1995/498), and to report on the
outcome of his efforts in that regard by 15 November 1995.
2. The asic obstacle to continuing and completing the
identification process relates to certain tribal groups and to
persons not resident inthe Territory, in whose identification the
Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro
(Frente POLISARIO) does not agree to participate and, in many
instances, has no sheikh, or alternate, to propose. Identification
has hitherto involved he participation of a sheikh or alternate from
each side and the presence of representatives of the two parties and
of Organization of African Unity (OAU) observer. The operation as
been hindered by the nability or unwillingness any one party o make a
sheikh or alternate available at giventime and place. As a result,
the identification process has been slow and uneven and in the last
few weeks has virtually come to a halt.
3. In my report of 8 September 1995 (S/1995/779), I stated that the
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
had an obligation to consider all applications which had been
correctly submitted. The essence of the dentification process was,
firstly, to establish the personal identity f the applicant and,
condly, to determine whether he or she qualified for inclusion in the
electoral roll under one of he five eligibility criteria.
Bringing a person to be tified did not prejudge the decision. To
enable MINURSO to meet its obligation in circumstances where the
Frente POLISARIO was unwilling or unable to make a sheikh available,
I suggested that identification should be based on documentary
evidence.
4. I explained my proposal in more detail at a meeting on 10 October
1995 with Mr. Driss Slaoui, Counsellor to His Majesty King Hassan II
of Morocco, Mr. Driss Basri, Minister of State for the Interior,
General Housni Bensliman and Ambassador Ahmed Snoussi. I also
instructed m Acting Special Representative, Mr. Erik Jensen, to
communicate my proposal of members of the Security Council during
informal consultations on 11 October, and directly to the Frente
POLISARIO leadership upon his return to the region. This he did on 19
October at a meeting at Tindouf with Mr. Mahfoud Ali Beiba. On 27
October, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, I
provided further elaboration of my proposal (S/1995/924).
5. In a letter dated 26 October, Mr. Ali Beiba assured my Acting
Special Representative of the Frente POLISARIO's willingness to
cooperate with the programme that the Secretary-General would
establish to identify all persons whose applications had been
received in the Territory and outside, in the camps an the Tindouf
region and in Mauritania, in conformity with the settlement plan.
6. The Government of Morocco informed my Acting Special
Representative of its unwillingness to accept a process that would
differentiate between different groups of applicants and reiterated
its insistence on ral testimony. In communications to my Acting
Special Representative, dated 25 and 29 October 1995, Mr. Basri
rejected a change in rocedure which his Government believed was
prejudicial to the inalienable rights of Western Saharans to equal
treatment by the Identification Commission and to the interests of
Morocco. The distinction proposed between the treatment of members of
85 subfractions and other applicants would mount to discrimination
and was, in Morocco's view, contrary to the settlement plan. Morocco
considered this suggested "simplification" of the procedure as a
radical departure from the settlement plan and the instructions to
the Identification Commission which recognized the specific nature of
Saharan society and the roleof oral testimony longside various types
of documentary evidence. The Minister reiterated Morocco's
reservations regarding documents issued by the former Spanish
administration of the Territory.
7. I propose, therefore, that the operation can be completed only
with the adoption of he following procedure. In accordance with
established practice and agreed principles, both parties will be
invited to present sheikh, or alternate, ofthe subfraction cerned and
to be represented during the identification process. An OAU observer
is also expected to attend. When two sheikhs, or alternates, are
present, one from each side, identification will take place according
to the normal proceeding. When one party does not, for whatever
reason, provide a sheikh or alternate, identification will take place
on the basis of appropriate documentation, with the assistance of the
one sheikh present. In the case that neither party is willing or able
to make available a sheikh or alternate, identification will be based
on documentary evidence only.
8. The settlement plan provides for the lodging of appeals against he
inclusion o exclusion of any names in the list of eligible voters
established by the Identification Commission. This should serve as
additional guarantee to both parties. This procedure is further
detailed in the terms of reference of the Identification Commission
(S/26185).
9. On 9 November, I instructed my Acting Special Representative to
convey my intention orally to the two parties. On 13 November, he met
with Mr. Basri in Rabat, and on 14 November with Mr. Ali Beiba near
Tindouf.
10. In a communication from Mr. Basri to my Acting Special
epresentative dated 13 November, the Government of Morocco wished to
be assured that the sheikh, when the only one present, would
contribute to the identification in exactly the same manner as when
there were two. It again emphasized the "privileged" place of oral
testimony in the identification process. Having already rejected any
attempt to limit valid documents to those issued by the Spanish
authorities, it considered the reference to appropriate documentation
as too vague and therefore liable to a restrictive interpretation. It
further found unacceptable the proposal that identification could
take place without the participation of any sheikh. In its view, this
had no basis in the settlement plan and instructions to the
Identification Commission, since it would exclude oral testimony
entirely.
11. In a letter dated 18 November, Mr. Mohamed
Abdelaziz,Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, stated that the
Frente POLISARIO would not subscribe to my new proposal, which it
considered as a reversal of the earlier approach. It could not accept
the pretext offered of a so-called departure from the framework of
the settlement planor a refusal of the other party to subscribe tohe
proposal in my etter to he Security Council of 27 October
(S/1995/924). Mr. Abdelaziz stressed that th Frente POLISARIO had not
been consulted in the formulation of the eligibility criteria and
that its sition had not been taken into account in the compromise
concerning the interpretation and application of the criteria. In the
Frente POLISARIO's view, the implementation of my new proposal would
again give Morocco an added advantage and the opportunity to
introduce, by means of a sheikh of itshoice and of its own documents,
135,000 applicants who had no ties with Western Sahara. This would be
tantamount to holding a referendum for a people other than he Western
Saharans. Adoption of such an approach would prompt the Frente
POLISARIO to draw the "appropriate" conclusions as to its involvement
with regard to the settlement plan. Mr. Abdelaziz warned that the
stability of the North African region was at stake.
12. As of 18 November 1995, all 233,487 applications have been
processed (176,533 in the Territory and on the Moroccan side, 42,468
in the camps and Tindouf area, and 14,486 in Mauritania). Of those,
75,79 have been convoked (46,701 in the Territory and 29,093 in the
camps), of which 58,947 have been identified (37,708 in the Territory
and 21,239 in the camps), as shown in the annex to the present
report. In spite of repeated convocations, the number of applicants
to come forward varies from 75 per cent of those convoked in the
camps to 80 per cent in the Territory.
13. A total of 157,693 applicants remain. As has been the case, the
number of persons coming forward is unlikely to exceed 80 per cent of
those convoked. Experience has shown that it is technically possible
for at least 3,000 persons to be identified per month at any one
centre. If identification is allowed to proceed in accordance with
the above procedures and without interruption, a total of 12 centres
should, therefore, be able to complete identification within about
four months, at a rate of 36,000 applicants per month.
14. The Government of Maurita has confirmed its agreement to the
opening of an identification centre at Atar, which is almost
equidistant from Nouadhibou and Zouerate and close to the border area
where many applicants reside. A technical mission has completed its
work and preparatory arrangements are being made, although conditions
are difficult.
15. The identification will continue as hitherto in the case of 85
out of 88 subfractions which are listed in the census of 1974 and for
which a list of sheikhs and alternates has already been established.
However, the absence of a sheikh, representative or observer will not
prevent identification from proceeding after the schedule for
identification has bee duly communicated to the parties, the
convocation lists have been issued and the hours of work
announced.
16. In the case of the remaining three census groups (H41, H61 and
J51/52) and in those instances wher identification takes place
outside the Territory and the Tindouf area, identification would
proceed with the participation of one side only. Both partie would be
invited to provide sheikhs and representatives; it is my hope that
both would be represented even in circumstances when they do not
provide a sheikh. In all cases there will be n change in the
procedure already established, which reflects the relevant provisions
of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464 and compromise proposal
(S/26185, annex I) as regards oral testimony and documentary
evidence. Paragraphs 14 to 23 of the compromise proposal describe the
nature of admissible documentation. It will be up to the
Identification Commission to determine the validity of the oral
testimony and of the documentary evidence and to decide on the merits
of each applicant to be included in the electoral roll. The
Identification Commission will be able to carry out its work only if
both parties place their trust in its judgement and integrity.
17. Neither party is likely to be satisfied with my proposal to
proceed with the identification in the manner described in paragraph
7 of the present report. Morocco wants to limit, to the extent
possible, the role of documentary evidence and give privilege to that
of oral testimony. The Frente POLISARIO considers that the
implementation of the new approach will allow for the introduction of
applicants who have no ties with Western Sahara. I have, however,
concluded that the new approach is the only way the process can be
carried forward. I hope that both parties will be persuaded to
cooperate and give the identification operation a chance. Should it
fail to proceed with the necessary speed, it will be my intention, as
requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1017 (1995), to
present for the consideration of the Council alternative options,
including the possibility of MINURSO's withdrawal.
18. In closing, I should like to thank my Acting Special
Representative for his untiring efforts to move the process forward
and those Member States that have assisted in the consultations with
the parties.