UNITED NATIONS

Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/240

30 March
1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
PDF formate

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in
pursuance of Council resolution 973 (1995) of 13 January 1995.
It covers developments since my report of 14 December 1994

(S/1994/1420). It is divided into five main sections.
Sections II and III cover the identification process and other
aspects of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464 and
Corr.1). Section IV discusses the arrangements for the
deployment of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO) at full strength and provides an

update on the activities of the Mission's military and
civilian police components. Section V is devoted to the
financial aspects. Section VI contains my observations.


II. IDENTIFICATION PROCESS


2. Together with monitoring and verifying the cease-fire, the
identification of potential voters, which started on 28 August
1994, remains the core activity of MINURSO at present. The
identification started in two centres, one in Laayoune and
another in the Tindouf area. During my visit to the Mission

from 25 to 29 November 1994, I urged the parties to continue
cooperating with my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Erik
Jensen, so as to facilitate rapid progress in the
implementation of the settlement plan.

3. By the end of 1994, a second identification centre had

opened on each side, bringing the total to four. In February
1995, a new centre was opened in the town of Smara in Western
Sahara and another reopened in the El-Aiun refugee camp near
Tindouf. This camp had suffered the most during the autumn
rainstorms and flooding. On 9 March 1995, a seventh centre

was inaugurated, in the town of Dakhla in the Territory.

Arrangements have been completed to establish a centre also in
the Dakhla camp, some 180 kilometres from Tindouf, which will
be opened as soon as the necessary technical installations can
be completed.


4. As pointed out in my December report (S/1994/1420), the
identification of potential voters is a complex operation. It
has been agreed that identification
95-09063 (E) 300395 /...
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can take place only when two tribal leaders (sheikhs), one
from each side, are present to testify. The representatives
of the two parties and an observer of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) are also expected to attend. It follows
that work has to be suspended when one side or the other
experiences difficulties in making its sheikh available or,

preferring a delay, has its sheikh fail to arrive, arrive late
or leave the centre. Moreover, both sides' earlier insistence
on strict reciprocity has meant that whenever, for whatever
reason, identification cannot take place at a centre on one
side, work is automatically suspended at a centre on the
other.


5. The process of identifying each potential voter takes
time. It is only through meticulous examination of material
evidence and through detailed interviews with applicants, with
the assistance of the sheikhs, that the identity of each
individual can be convincingly established and the extent to

which he or she qualifies under any of the criteria can be
determined. The proceedings cannot be rushed if they are to
carry conviction. In most cases, the lack of documents
greatly complicates the operation. In addition to interviews,
every applicant has his or her photograph and fingerprint
taken and, after identification, is given a receipt. The

receipt serves solely to facilitate retrieval of the relevant
file; it has no intrinsic value, since voters cards will be
issued only after cases have been carefully reviewed and
voters lists published.

6. The degree of attention which the representatives of the

two parties pay to every step of the process, their insistence
on receiving from MINURSO full convocation lists in good time,
their concern for every question asked and the notes that they
record on every case, illustrate vividly the importance that
they attach to the identification process. In a society where

virtually all individuals are known and every tribal subgroup
is represented on both sides, it would be obvious if people
were being excluded. But to make quite sure that no applicant
is prevented from coming forward, provision has also been made
for individuals to present themselves at any MINURSO
identification centre while the process continues. This is

already occurring, but will become more important at a later
stage. This painstaking and somewhat cumbersome approach is
the surest way of achieving transparency, since both sides are
fully informed about all aspects and any attempt by one side

to control or influence the process would at once be apparent
to the other.

7. On 14 December 1994, the Government of Spain forwarded
important archival material to my Deputy Special

Representative, at his request. This comprised 48 volumes of
birth certificates, 19 volumes of marriage certificates,
11 volumes of divorce certificates and 11 volumes of death
certificates, which together constitute the Registro Civil
Cheranico del Sahara Occidental. These documents have been
classified by MINURSO identification staff and are proving of

considerable value as aids to identification, especially for
doubtful cases, and for the exhaustive review of all files
currently undertaken in conjunction with the observations
received from the representatives of the parties.

8. From the start, however, the single greatest obstacle to

identification has been the issue of tribal leaders. The
settlement plan gave tribal leaders the responsibility for
identifying applicants as being the persons they claim to be
and as belonging to a particular tribal group (subfraction);
the sheikhs were also to provide oral testimony relevant to
the eligibility criteria. Most sheikhs, elected as they were

in 1973, were already of mature years at the time and many
have since died or become incapacitated. There are, in
consequence, a large number of subfractions, one third of the
total, without a recognized tribal leader on at least one
side. Until last year, this unresolved issue had been the
most intractable obstacle to identification.


9. In the summer of 1994, my Deputy Special Representative
proposed to the parties that the process start with those
subfractions where there was a surviving and competent sheikh
on each side. At the same time, he advised the parties that,
whatever the survival rate, there should always be the same

number of sheikhs present for each side, normally one each,
during any given identification session. Both parties agreed
to this proposal.

10. The Deputy Special Representative then focused on the
search for a formula to deal with the other cases. The views

of the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y
de Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) and the Government of Morocco
diverged markedly. The Frente POLISARIO argued that to avoid
any subsequent manipulation of the selection of sheikhs, only
sheikhs elected in the Territory in 1973, or their eldest

sons, should be eligible to testify. Morocco opposed the view
that the 1973 list of sheikhs could not be changed. It argued
that the 1973 election of sheikhs under Spanish rule was the
only one ever held in the Territory, that sheikhs were
traditionally co-opted and not elected, that not all Saharan
sheikhs were necessarily in the Territory in 1973 and that

those elected in 1973 might subsequently have been replaced by
others, since their term of office was to last only five
years.

11. A measure of convergence began to emerge recently. On 10
February 1995, my Deputy Special Representative addressed
similar letters to the Moroccan authorities and to the Frente
POLISARIO in which he set out his proposal in detail. A
surviving sheikh from the 1973 election was to be preferred;

then his eldest surviving son; then a candidate from the
election of 1973, normally by descending number of votes
received; and failing that, the party would put forward three
names from which the Chairman of the Identification Commission
would select one, after consultation with the other party.
The three names were to be of persons from the subfraction

concerned, of recognized standing in their community, of
appropriate age, without any official position and themselves
included in the census lists of 1974. Attached to his letters
was a list of all 88 tribal subgroups (subfractions) included
in the 1974 census and such information as was available to
MINURSO concerning the sheikhs, sons of sheikhs and

non-elected candidates from the 1973 election; in the 29 cases
where no such person was known, a blank space was left for the
three names to be provided by the parties.

12. In their written response of 13 February 1995, the
Moroccan authorities maintained that there had been no prior

commitment on their part to certain of the limitations, but
they took note of further clarification offered in writing by
my Deputy Special Representative on 18 February 1995. On 23
and 25 February 1995, meetings took place in Tindouf and in
Laayoune with the responsible officials of the Frente
POLISARIO and of the Government of Morocco respectively. At

the meeting in Laayoune, the Moroccan authorities provided
detailed statistical information concerning the whereabouts of
all members of the subfractions listed as resident in the
Territory. Arrangements were also discussed regarding the
identification centres to which those persons would come when
their number locally was insufficient to warrant the

deployment of tribal leaders. The Moroccan authorities
undertook to make available names of candidates to replace
sheikhs as required. On 26 February 1995, the Frente
POLISARIO submitted a full response in writing, reiterating
certain concerns and returning the list of subfractions
completed with the names of persons to be considered as

replacements in the absence of sheikhs.

13. As indicated in paragraph 3 above, there will soon be four
centres on each side, bringing the total to eight. Sixteen
identification teams are to be assigned to these eight

centres. Local conditions and logistics permitting,
experience has shown that two identification teams working in
tandem at each centre have the capacity to process up to 150
cases each day. However, the increasing percentage of
subfractions represented by 50 individuals or fewer in an area
limits MINURSO's ability to achieve this figure at all

centres. However, with the latest agreement on tribal
representatives and the information provided by the parties,
as described in the preceding paragraph, it is now realistic

to expect that approximately 20,000 applicants could be
processed per month at eight centres.

14. Once additional qualified staff and equipment become
available, two more centres are to be established, if the

parties concur in what may have to be an unbalanced
arrangement. There would then be 10 centres. Provision has
also been made for the deployment of five mobile teams to deal
with smaller numbers in more remote places. It is estimated
that as many as 25,000 persons could then be identified
monthly. This, however, will require an average weekly output

over two times greater than the best weekly figure yet
achieved and will be contingent upon the smooth functioning of
the complicated logistical arrangements and the full
cooperation of both parties.

15. As of mid-March 1995, over 21,300 persons had been

identified. This represents 16.5 per cent (13,473 out of
81,855) of those applicants in the Territory about whom
information is fully available to MINURSO and 27.3 per cent
(7,870 out of 28,831) of those in the camps in the Tindouf
area. MINURSO has complete computerized information relevant
to all applications received from persons to be identified in

the four population centres in Western Sahara (Boujdour,
Dakhla, Laayoune and Smara) and in the camps in the Tindouf
area (Awsard, Dakhla, El-Aiun and Es-Smara camps). The data
processing of the additional 14,568 applications received in
Mauritania, in spite of the many technical problems, has also
been completed.


16. The graph attached as annex I to the present report shows
in schematic form the progress achieved in the number of
persons identified per week since the start of identification
in late August 1994. It is encouraging that since the
beginning of this year progress has been steady and

incremental, with the exception of one week in January and
another at the end of February, when there was no
identification because of public holidays on both sides and a
dispute concerning a sheikh.

17. The number of OAU observers has been increased to eight.

The most recent arrivals came in good time for the opening of
the additional centres. The OAU observers are assigned to
follow the proceedings, the normal practice being for one
observer to be present at every centre during identification.
Collaboration between MINURSO and the OAU observers is very

good.


III. OTHER ASPECTS RELEVANT TO THE FULFILMENT
OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN


18. The Security Council, in its resolution 973 (1995),
requested me to report on my final plans for implementing all
elements of the settlement plan and on the responses of the
parties to them. In this context, it may be useful to recall,

as in my 12 July 1994 report to the Council (S/1994/819), the
main elements of the plan. During the transitional period,
the United Nations is to organize and conduct a referendum in
the Territory to enable the people of Western Sahara to choose
between independence and integration with Morocco. To this

end, there is to be a cease-fire followed by an exchange of
prisoners of war, a reduction in the Moroccan troops in the
Territory and confinement of the combatants of both sides to
specific locations. In order to ensure that the necessary
conditions exist for the holding of a free and fair
referendum, the United Nations will monitor other aspects of

the administration of the Territory, especially the
maintenance of law and order. Following the proclamation of
an amnesty, political prisoners will be released. All laws or
regulations that might impede the holding of a free and fair
referendum will be suspended as deemed necessary. All
refugees and other Western Saharan residents outside the

Territory who wish to return will be enabled to do so by the
United Nations, after the latter has established their right
to vote.

19. The cease-fire is already in place. The following
paragraphs cover the other activities undertaken or to be

undertaken in fulfilment of the plan.

Reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory

20. In his report of 19 April 1991 on the implementation of
the settlement plan (S/22464 and Corr.1), the then

Secretary-General reported that Morocco was prepared to reduce
its troops in the Territory to a level not exceeding
65,000 all ranks, within a period of 11 weeks from the
beginning of the transitional period. Mr. Perez de Cuellar
accepted this as an appropriate, substantial and phased
reduction in accordance with the settlement proposals. My

Deputy Special Representative has recently met with the
Commander of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces in the southern
zone, Major-General Abdelaziz Bennani, who assured him of
Morocco's preparedness to implement fully the provisions of
the settlement plan relating to the reduction of Moroccan
troops in the Territory, once D-Day and the start of the

transitional period have been determined.

Confinement of troops to designated locations

21. Paragraph 15 of document S/22464 states that, in

accordance with paragraph 56 of document S/21360, all
remaining Moroccan troops will be located in static or
defensive positions along the sand wall, known as the berm,
with the limited exceptions mentioned in that paragraph.
MINURSO military observers will monitor these troops and,
towards this end, will be co-located with Moroccan subsector

headquarters and with the Moroccan support and logistics units
remaining elsewhere in the Territory. MINURSO military
observers will also conduct extensive patrols by land and air
to ensure observance of the cease-fire and the confinement of

the Moroccan troops to the designated locations. In addition,
they will monitor the custody of certain arms and ammunition.

22. It will be recalled that, in accordance with the
settlement plan, my Special Representative is to designate the

locations to which Frente POLISARIO troops will be confined,
with their arms, ammunition and military equipment.
Preliminary consultations have been initiated on this issue so
that I can take the necessary decisions and proceed with the
arrangements that will be required in this regard. MINURSO
military observers will be deployed at each of the designated

locations in order to monitor the Frente POLISARIO troops.

Independent jurist and release of political prisoners and
detainees

23. The settlement plan (S/21360, paras. 33 (b) and 70)

specifies that an independent jurist will be appointed by the
Secretary-General who, in cooperation with the parties, will
take steps to ensure the release of all Saharan political
prisoners and detainees before the beginning of the referendum
campaign, so that they can participate freely and without
restriction in the referendum. I have appointed Mr. Emmanuel

Roucounas (Greece), a prominent international jurist, as the
independent jurist. I hope that, with the cooperation of both
parties, he can expeditiously discharge his task.

Exchange of prisoners of war


24. The settlement plan provides for an exchange of prisoners
of war under the auspices of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC). My Deputy Special Representative has
been in contact with ICRC, which has visited prisoners of war
on both sides. ICRC has stated that it is ready to start
working on their release as soon as the parties are ready to

do so. It remains my earnest hope that further sustained
efforts will enable ICRC to achieve the release of all
prisoners of war from both sides as soon as possible after the
transitional period begins.

Organization of the referendum


25. The settlement plan provides for the establishment of a
Referendum Commission to assist the Special Representative in
the organization and conduct of the referendum. The functions
of the Referendum Commission, which include measures for the

referendum campaign and the actual conduct of the referendum,
are specified in paragraphs 63 to 66 of document S/21360 and
further detailed in paragraphs 25 to 31 of document S/22464.
The Referendum Commission will absorb appropriately qualified
staff of the Identification Commission, upon completion of the
latter's tasks of identification and registration.


26. In my last report to the Security Council (S/1994/1420), I
noted that the draft code of conduct for the referendum
campaign had already been completed. It was forwarded to the

two parties on 13 December 1994. The Frente POLISARIO
submitted detailed comments and proposals on 31 January 1995
and the Government of Morocco on 15 February. The replies
received reflect major differences between the two sides on
several issues. The United Nations Secretariat has reconciled

their versions to the extent possible in order to finalize the
code without undue delay.

Return of refugees, other Western Saharans and members of the
Frente POLISARIO entitled to vote


27. The modalities for the repatriation of those Western
Saharans who are identified as eligible to vote in the
referendum and who wish to return to the Territory are
described in document S/21360 (paras. 33 (c) and (d)
and 72-74) and further detailed in document S/22464 (paras.
34-36). The repatriation programme forms an integral part of

the MINURSO operation and is to be carried out by the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
in accordance with its mandate. UNHCR's task will be
threefold: to ascertain and record the repatriation wishes of
each Western Saharan as he or she is registered as a voter by
the Identification Commission; to issue the necessary

documentation to the members of his or her immediate family;
and to establish and manage, in cooperation with MINURSO,
which will provide security, the reception centres that will
be established in the Territory for the returning Western
Saharans.


28. A UNHCR technical team visited the mission area from 2 to
15 February 1995 in order to review the plans for the
repatriation operation. It visited potential repatriation
sites in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory,
as well as all the refugee camps in the Tindouf area in
Algeria. It also undertook a full review of the work it will

carry out with the administration, civilian police and
military components of MINURSO.

29. The UNHCR team estimated that the preparatory work, which
has already commenced, will require six months. Repatriation
would then begin shortly after the Identification Commission

had finished its work, and would be completed in about 80
days, immediately before the referendum campaign. UNHCR would
thereafter maintain a presence in the Territory, as necessary,
in order to fulfil its monitoring role for returnees, in
accordance with its internationally accepted responsibilities.




IV. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MINURSO AT FULL
STRENGTH

30. Under resolution 973 (1995), the Security Council

requested me to confirm, inter alia, the arrangements with
regard to the logistic, personnel and other resources required
for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength. As noted in
my last report, I dispatched a technical team to MINURSO in

November 1994 to review these requirements. As indicated
above, in February 1995 UNHCR also sent a team to the mission
area to update its plans for the voluntary repatriation of
refugees. On the basis of the information gathered by these
missions, a preliminary logistics plan and financial

implications for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength
have been prepared. This plan has been closely coordinated
with UNHCR's own logistic requirements, with a view to
maximizing the use of resources and sharing the cost of common
assets. The plan will need to be further refined as soon as a
decision is made on the date for the beginning of the

transitional period.

Military component

31. The current strength of MINURSO's military component,
headed by the Force Commander, Brigadier-General Andre Van

Baelen (Belgium), totals 288 personnel, comprising 240
military observers and 48 military support personnel (see
annex II).

32. As noted in my previous reports, pending the fulfilment of
the conditions necessary for the commencement of the

transitional period, the military mandate of MINURSO remains
restricted to monitoring and verifying the cease-fire, which
has been in effect since 6 September 1991. MINURSO continues
to receive good cooperation from the parties in regard to the
maintenance of the cease-fire. During the reporting period,
three minor cease-fire violations, pertaining to unauthorized

movements by both parties, were observed. MINURSO military
observers conduct daily patrols in all parts of the Territory,
undertaking a monthly average of 600 ground and 140 aerial
reconnaissance patrols in extremely harsh conditions and over
great distances (see map at annex III).


33. The original military requirements of MINURSO, described
in document S/22464 of 19 April 1991, consisted of a total
military strength of about 1,695 (all ranks) as follows: 550
military observers; an infantry battalion of 700 (all ranks);
an air support group of 110 (all ranks) to operate and
maintain four fixed-wing aircraft and eight transport

helicopters; a signals unit of 45 (all ranks); a medical unit
of 50 (all ranks); a composite military police company of 40
(all ranks); and a logistics battalion of 200 (all ranks).
These requirements have been thoroughly reviewed and it has
been determined that they remain largely appropriate, although

adjustments may have to be made to the size of certain units.
In addition, based on the experience gained since the
deployment of MINURSO, and given the conditions prevalent in
Western Sahara, it is considered that an engineering unit of
approximately 100 (all ranks) would also be required to
perform, inter alia, the following tasks: limited mine

clearing; basic infrastructure repair; and the construction
and operation of water points in certain specific areas
essential to MINURSO operations. Every effort will be made to

include this unit within the overall military strength of
1,695 (all ranks).

Civilian police component


34. Under resolution 973 (1995), the Security Council
authorized an increase in the deployed strength of the
civilian police component of MINURSO from 55 to 160 observers.
As of 25 March 1995, the component totalled 78 personnel from
the following countries: Austria (10); Germany (5); Hungary
(13); Malaysia (15); Nigeria (15); Norway (5); Togo (5); and

Uruguay (10). An additional 26 civilian police observers from
Ghana (15) and Togo (11) are scheduled to be deployed shortly,
bringing the total strength of the component to 104. The
strength of the civilian police component will be further
increased to 160, as additional identification and
registration centres become operational.


35. It will be recalled that, in accordance with document
S/22464, the civilian police component was to total 300
observers. The Civilian Police Commissioner has recommended
that its strength be increased by 99 observers. This
recommendation is being reviewed.


36. The activities of the civilian police component are
currently linked to those of the Identification Commission and
have expanded as the work of the Commission has increased.
MINURSO civilian police observers maintain a 24-hour presence
at the identification centres in order to ensure their

security and to verify that no person is denied entry for the
purposes of identification. The police component also
provides technical assistance to the Identification
Commission, as appropriate.

37. During the reporting period, the Civilian Police

Commissioner, Colonel Jurgen Friedrich Reimann (Germany),
completed his tour of duty with MINURSO and was replaced by
Colonel Wolf-Dieter Krampe (Germany), who assumed his
functions on 13 March 1995.

38. I have had preliminary consultations with Member States to

ascertain their readiness to provide the military and civilian
police personnel required for the deployment of MINURSO at
full strength. Initial informal responses received thus far
indicate that Member States will be in a position to provide
most of the military and civilian police personnel required.

However, offers are still awaited regarding some of the
specialized units. The Secretariat will continue its
consultations with potential contributing countries to ensure
that contingents are made available in a timely manner and
that they are deployed with all the standard basic equipment.


Civilian personnel

39. MINURSO's present authorized staff level is 251, including
Professional staff (81), General Service staff (78), Field

Service staff (37) and local staff (55). With the expansion
of the Identification Commission under resolution 973 (1995),
the number of civilian personnel considered necessary to carry
out the Mission's present functions is 132 Professionals, 145
General Service, 43 Field Service and 90 local staff,

totalling some 410 persons. These requirements, along with
other budgetary issues, are presently under consideration by
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions. The full deployment of MINURSO will probably not
require additional Professional staff, for, as noted above,
those presently serving with the Identification Commission

will take on new functions during the transitional period. It
is estimated, however, that additional General Service, Field
Service and local staff will be required, particularly during
the two-month period leading up to and during the referendum.
Approximately 300 polling officers will also be required for
two to three weeks at the time of the referendum. The

Secretariat is exploring the possibility of arranging for the
recruitment of United Nations Volunteers for this purpose.

Equipment requirements

40. As mentioned in previous reports, the extreme weather

conditions in the mission area have taken a toll on MINURSO's
equipment during the past three and a half years. In
addition, MINURSO's current air-support and communications
systems are inadequate for the full deployment of the Mission.
These factors have been taken into account in updating the
logistics plan for full deployment. They may also have

implications for the eventual level of civilian and/or
military personnel required.

41. Although the logistics plan will be further refined closer
to the start of the transitional period, preliminary cost
estimates for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength will

be provided in an addendum to the present report. As noted
above, it is the intention that, to the extent possible,
MINURSO will share the cost of common assets, such as water,
accommodation and power, with UNHCR at those sites where
MINURSO and UNHCR will be co-located. This will be taken into
account in further refining the cost estimates.



V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

42. Authorization has been granted to me, under the terms of

General Assembly decision 49/466 and resolution 49/233 of 23
December 1994, to enter into a financial commitment in an
amount not to exceed $17,290,100 gross ($16,130,300 net) for
the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1 January to 31
March 1995. My report on the financing of MINURSO for the
period from 1 December 1994 to 30 June 1995 and for the

maintenance of the Mission on a monthly basis after 30 June
1995, including the expansion of the Identification
Commission, as approved by the Council in resolution 973

(1995), has been submitted to the General Assembly for
consideration at its current session.

43. The cash flow situation of the special account of MINURSO
remains precarious. As of 21 March 1995, unpaid assessed

contributions to it amounted to $20.3 million. Consequently,
reimbursement of troop costs has been made only up to the
period ending 31 August 1994. In addition, amounts are
outstanding for contingent-owned equipment. In order to
provide the Mission with the necessary cash flow, a total of
$8.2 million has been borrowed from other peace-keeping

accounts. These loans remain unpaid. The total outstanding
assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 21
March 1995 was $1,678.5 million.


VI. OBSERVATIONS


44. Patience and perseverance have helped to launch the
identification process and to overcome the numerous problems
that have arisen. Over 21,000 persons have been identified.
The suspicion and mistrust that have characterized the process
are gradually being dampened. However, they can easily be

rekindled by those who, for motives of their own, may wish to
undermine the process.

45. Less than a year ago, very few believed that the
identification process would even start. Last autumn, after
it began at last, the pace was such as to inspire little faith

in its being completed within the foreseeable future. Now,
the Security Council has adopted resolution 973 (1995), the
additional resources necessary for its implementation have
been promised and agreement has been reached on how
identification might be carried forward. The holding of the
referendum has thus become a real possibility.


46. There are currently seven identification centres, with six
functioning at any one time. Plans are in hand to expand the
operation further. The computerization of the applications
received and, in particular, the agreement of the parties to a
formula for choosing tribal leaders to replace sheikhs who are

no longer living or capable offer the best prospects so far
for progress towards the referendum.

47. The parties have been drawn into a new degree of
engagement. At the same time, concern about the outcome has

contributed to increasing nervousness. Completion of the
operation will depend on the smooth functioning of the complex
logistical arrangements, the ready availability of sheikhs and
tribal leaders and flexibility on the part of representatives
and observers. The difficulties are complicated by the vast
distances, in a territory of 266,000 square kilometres, and

the dispersal of the members of each tribal subgroup
throughout the towns of Western Sahara and the camps near
Tindouf.

48. Progress in identification will depend more than anything
on the collaboration of both parties. I urge them to abandon
any insistence on strict reciprocity in the number of centres
and on the linkage of a centre on one side with a specific
centre on the other, since the distribution of population is

uneven. Nor should limits be imposed on the numbers to be
identified on any given day. There should be no reluctance to
permit the process to advance more expeditiously in one place
than the other. A responsible official should be always
available to meet with the Identification Commission to
resolve difficulties as they arise.


49. It is equally important that the parties proceed
expeditiously with the implementation of the other aspects of
the settlement plan.

50. Morocco has indicated its willingness to proceed with the

reduction of its troops in the Territory, as required by the
settlement plan. It has also indicated its commitment to
cooperate in implementing the other provisions relevant to the
confinement of its forces. I hope that my Deputy Special
Representative can similarly count on the cooperation of the
Frente POLISARIO as regards the cantonment of its troops.


51. In my last report, I expressed the hope that progress
achieved in the identification and registration process by 31
March 1995, would enable me to recommend 1 June 1995 as the
date (D-Day) for the start of the transitional period. While
the rate of identification is increasing, the progress

achieved to date does not permit me to make this
recommendation now. If, however, the parties make it possible
to raise the rate of identification to the 25,000 per month
foreseen in paragraph 14 above, and if they cooperate in
resolving expeditiously the remaining issues in the settlement
plan, it can be envisaged that the transitional period could

begin in August 1995 and the referendum be held in January
1996.

52. Finally, I would like to underline the significance of the
settlement plan for the whole region. This is why I urge all
concerned to maintain their commitment to its implementation

and why I recommend that there be no lessening of the
Council's support for MINURSO at this stage.

53. In closing, I should like to pay tribute to my Deputy
Special Representative, the Force Commander, the Civilian

Police Commissioner, and to all the civilian, military and
police personnel of MINURSO, for their determined efforts in
furthering the settlement plan.

ANNEX I


Identification figures graph

ANNEX II

Composition of MINURSO military component



(a) Military observers

Argentina 7
Austria 4
Bangladesh 7
Belgium 1

China 20
Egypt 9
El Salvador 2
France 30
Ghana 6
Greece 1

Guinea 1
Honduras 14
Ireland 9
Italy 6
Kenya 10
Republic of Korea 2

Malaysia 15
Nigeria 4
Pakistan 4
Poland 2
Russian Federation 30
Tunisia 9

Uruguay 15
United States of America 30
Venezuela 2

Total 240


(b) Military support personnel

(i) Medical Unit: Republic of Korea 40

(ii) Clerical: Ghana 8


Total 48

Grand total 288


S/1995/240

English
Page

16
ANNEX III

MINURSO deployment map


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