STATEMENT OF MR. MAHUD ALI BEIAB
Head of the Delegation of the Frente
POLISARIO
Manhasset-Fourth Round
17 March 2008
- español
His Excellency Mr Peter Van Walsum
Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara,
Mr Julian Harston,
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Western Sahara
Ladies and Gentlemen members of the UN delegation,
Members of the delegation of Morocco,
Members of the delegations of the neighbouring countries, Algeria and
Mauritania
Mr Personal Envoy,
We gather again here in Manhasset under your auspices within the
framework established by resolutions 1754 and 1783 (2007) whereby the
Security Council called on the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco to enter
into negotiations, in good faith, with a view to achieving a peaceful
solution to the conflict that provides for the right of the Sahrawi
people to self-determination.
As we had the opportunity to recall in Manhasset I, Morocco had
committed itself to the respect for and implementation of this
fundamental right, until it decided to invade and occupy by force our
country in 1975 in the context of a project of territorial expansion of
which other countries of the region had already been direct targets.
In that year, our people were a victim of a war of extermination where
Napalm and white Phosphorus were used, a war that continues to date by
means of a policy of violation of human rights that has caused hundreds
of both civilian and military disappeared, arbitrary detentions and
torture that are being carried out with impunity owing to the media
blackout imposed on the Territory.
We are a people that have shown determination and political will to
resist and to continue their resistance until the full attainment,
today or tomorrow, of their legitimate right to self-determination and
independence.
Yet we have spared no effort to give tangible possibilities for a
peaceful solution to the conflict that was imposed on us by force,
following the withdrawal of the European colonial power, by a neighbour
from whom we expected support and solidarity.
In 1991, by accepting the Settlement Plan by virtue of which the
Security Council deployed MINURSO to the Territory, Morocco seemed to
return to reason and to its prior commitment to allow the Sahrawi
people to decide freely their future by opting for independence or
integration into this country within the framework of a
self-determination referendum organised and supervised by the United
Nations in cooperation with the Organisation of African Unity.
Despite the obstructions put in the way of the identification of
voters, Morocco reaffirmed once again, in an equivocal manner to James
Baker, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, its attachment to the
referendum process (S/1997/882 of 13 November 1997). Houston Agreements
that were accepted by Morocco and endorsed by the Security Council
describe in detail all the steps that should be taken until the
proclamation of the results of the self-determination referendum.
Everything was ready for the achievement of a just and lasting peace.
However, as James Baker reaffirmed in August 2004, Morocco decided
“that it was no longer ready to go forward with the process”. It then
began pursuing a policy marked by reneging on its commitments and
turning its back on international legality.
The process leading to the referendum has henceforth been stopped by
the unilateral decision of Morocco, and not by a purported
“unimplementability” of the referendum or by the incapacity of the
United Nations to bring the process to conclusion, as Morocco
claims.
The delegation of the Frente POLISARIO is firmly convinced that the
referendum process can and should be reactivated following the
guidelines and phases clearly detailed in the Settlement Plan, in the
Houston Agreements and Baker Plan, which cannot be thrown into the
wastepaper of history because of a hasty and irrational decision taken
in a bad mood.
These agreements represent a great and the only concurrence between the
parties, and between them and the United Nations for a just and lasting
solution to the conflict. To try to impose the elaboration of a new
framework of solution on the basis of something that goes against the
spirit, the letter and the objective of the peace agreements, which
were already accepted and endorsed by the Security Council, is an
attempt to which the Frente POLISARIO and, with certainty, the United
Nations, the region and Africa cannot subscribe or endorse.
In fact, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy stated
unequivocally that “the United Nations cannot sponsor a plan that
excluded a referendum with independence as an option while claiming to
provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”
(para.14, S/2006/817 of 16 October 2006).
Likewise, the position taken for over 20 years by the Organisation of
African Unity (now the African Union) and by the majority of the
countries of the region of northwest Africa regarding the Sahrawi
question leaves no room for doubt about the principles that should
guide any search for a just and lasting peace.
There are therefore principles of international law that are essential
for the United Nations as well as positions and facts that have
resisted the passage of time, and their strength has dashed the
expectations of the other party regarding the loss of their
consistency and value.
It is against this background that we have welcomed the opportunity
that was opened in April 2007 by the Security Council resolution 1754,
and have taken part, in good faith, in the Manhasset negotiation
process.
Unfortunately, as we have seen in its unjustified rejection of Baker
Plan, and its obstruction of the implementation of Houston Agreements
and the Settlement Plan and as we have also witnessed in the previous
rounds, Morocco does not seem yet to have understood the message, and
continues to insist on a proposal based on one option only, which aims
to legitimise an anachronistic expansionist project that violates the
UN Charter, and ignores the terms of reference established by the
international community for resolving the conflict of Western Sahara.
We would like, Mr Personal Envoy, to state before you and before the
Moroccan delegation the following, with the formal request that this
statement be brought to the attention of the Secretary-General and the
Security Council:
1. The Frente POLISARIO is ready to cooperate in the rigorous
implementation of the two resolutions of the Security Council, 1754 and
1783 (2007), that reaffirm the validity and relevance of the principle
of self-determination for the people of a territory that is still on
the list of the Special Committee of Decolonisation 33 years after the
withdrawal of the European colonial power. The United Nations does not
recognise for the present occupying power the sovereignty or even the
status of an administering power, as stated in the opinion of the UN
Legal Department issued on 29 January 2002.
2. Our view on the implementability of these resolutions is well-known.
We believe that the objective of Manhasset negotiations, as was the
case of the previous negotiations in Houston, London and Lisbon, is to
ensure the implementation—and not the negation—of the right of the
Sahrawi people to self-determination in line with the terms of
reference established by the international community in the General
Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).
This vision is flexible and broad because it includes all the options
for a self-determination referendum in conformity with this resolution.
It is a question of allowing the Sahrawi people to have the last word
regarding their future. No credible country or international
organisation can be against this principle.
3. The two parties should cooperate for assisting the United Nations to
bring to an end the last phase of the referendum process taking into
account the recent proposals, and the part of the distance already
covered by the United Nations with a view to reaching the proclamation
of the results of the referendum.
4. Our understanding consists, in short, in letting the United Nations
have the responsibility for bringing this process to conclusion by
asking the Sahrawi people about what they want regarding their future.
We do not prejudge the outcome, and we do not want to impose it either.
We want the Sahrawi people to have the possibility to go to the polls,
which represent the peaceful and democratic way to bring to an end this
protracted conflict whose continuation does not serve the credibility
of the United Nations, the security and stability of the region nor the
development of its peoples.
5. It is out of our will to contribute to the success of this process
that the Frente POLISARIO has accepted, and still accepts, to engage
constructively in discussing the issue of the confidence-building
measures (CBMs) that you proposed in the second round of negotiations.
There is also the highly sensitive issue relating to the respect for
human rights in the Territory that you, Mr Personal Envoy, referred to
in the third round as “probably the best confidence-building measure”,
while underlying that “it would be unrealistic to find a mutually
acceptable solution without addressing the question of human rights in
the context of our negotiations”. We regret that the Moroccan
delegation was not willing to engage in discussing this matter in the
context of the previous rounds of negotiation.
Although the Security Council called on us, in its resolution 1783
(2007), to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere
propitious for dialogue, Morocco continues to perpetrate gross
violations of human rights in the occupied territories, while remaining
opposed to a fundamental human right, namely the right to
self-determination. Obviously, this highly condemnable behaviour is yet
another demonstration of Morocco’s lack of political will, and it can
in no way contribute to creating the atmosphere of trust needed for the
success of the negotiations.
6. Morocco has, since 2004, its own surprising version of this right.
In fact, it opposes this right by wrongfully limiting it to just one
option in a way that goes against the letter and spirit of the General
Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which stipulates that the right to
self-determination should be exercised in accordance with the freely
expressed will and desire of the people concerned.
The Moroccan delegation came to Manhasset to reiterate that it is ready
to negotiate only a solution that would recognise beforehand the
“Moroccanity” of Western Sahara. This position preconditions and
prejudges the outcome of the negotiations. In no way can it be called
negotiations; rather, it is imposition. It also confuses
self-determination with forcible annexation. Moreover, Morocco argued
for the impossibility of holding a referendum, but at the same time
considers that its so-called proposal for solution provides for this
referendum.
What we see, in the final analysis, is an untenable position
vis-à-vis the UN Charter and the terms of reference established
by the Security Council from day one of its involvement in the solution
process. What we also see is an “approach” that is fraught with
fundamental contradictions in terms of the relevance and viability of a
referendum, which is unachievable for Morocco if the ballot options
include independence, and is feasible if the only option is the
so-called “autonomy”.
As all the previous peace plans endorsed by the UN Security Council,
the Frente POLISARIO considers that the referendum is possible and
should be held with at least two options.
Mr Personal Envoy,
The Frente POLISARIO has offered Morocco a proposal for solution of
which the Security Council has taken note in its resolutions 1754 and
1783 (2007). This proposal has the merit of not only complying fully
with the international legality but also laying out a vision for the
future that would be conducive to the establishment of friendly and
cooperative relations with Morocco in political, economic and security
domains. The Frente POLISARIO is also committed to accepting the
results of the referendum, whatever they are, and to negotiate with
Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, the guarantees that
could be granted to our northern neighbour, and to address all those
areas that are of special concern to it, in the event that the voters
in the self-determination referendum opt for the independence of
Western Sahara.
We believe that there is a need to avoid that the process becomes
deadlocked, because it could lead to perilous consequences for all, for
the parties, the region and for the credibility and capacity of the
United Nations in the resolution of the conflict, which may affect
directly the international peace and security. However, the Moroccan
refusal to discuss our proposal for solution together with its
opposition to discussing the proposed confidence-building measures, and
its continuous violation of human rights in the Territory carry the
seeds of a possible stalemate.
Furthermore, the behaviour of the Moroccan side in Manhasset is
accompanied these days by facts on the ground relating to huge
movements of troops, military manoeuvres and massive logistical
preparations in the occupied areas of Dakhla, Auserd and south-eastern
Morocco that point towards a possible breach of the cease-fire whose
consequences only Morocco should assume before the region and the world
at large.
Mr Personal Envoy,
This is the fourth round in the Manhasset negotiation process. You have
deployed enormous efforts and demonstrated a great deal of patience.
Your recent visit to the region has served to deepen the discussion and
the awareness of the urgency of a just and lasting solution to a
conflict that has caused suffering, destruction, insecurity and rift
among the peoples of the region. We would like to thank you as well as
your team for your perseverance and encouragement for a peace in
conformity with international legality. Our appreciation goes also to
the two neighbouring countries.
You will agree with us, Mr. Personal Envoy, that the negotiation should
lead to overcoming the obstacles and moving forward in the right
direction. It cannot become an end in itself, and cannot be undermined
with preconditions that makes it lose its raison d’être.
The Security Council has called on us to negotiate without
preconditions, in good faith, with a view to ensuring the respect for
the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. We ought
therefore to allow you and the United Nations to take the necessary
steps to bring the process to conclusion, by giving the Sahrawi people
the peaceful and democratic opportunity, which is in keeping with
international legality, to decide their future opting for one of the
two proposals that the parties submitted to the United Nations in April
2007.
Your predecessor, James Baker, with the agreement of the two parties,
paved the way for reaching this moment by detailing what should be done
regarding the identification of voters, the confinement of troops, the
return of the refugees and the electoral campaign as well as the
proclamation of the results of the referendum. It is to be recalled
that the late king Hassan II declared that he “would respect those
results”. Today, Morocco is saying that its proposal can and should be
submitted to a popular vote. This means, in other words, that the
position of Morocco has evolved, and that it believes that a referendum
is possible now. In this case, let the UN organise the said referendum,
let Morocco campaign for its autonomy, let the Frente POLISARIO
campaign for the independence option, and then let the people of
Western Sahara decide.
We think that, if we take these elements into consideration, there are
real possibilities for achieving a substantive progress. The United
Nations today should take advantage of this opportunity and assume its
responsibility, since it seems to us that it cannot find a historic
chance better than the one derived from these elements. It also should
not stay paralysed before a conflict of decolonisation whose lack of
resolution affects its credibility and threaten regional peace and
stability.
We therefore hope that this round would be decisive for moving ahead
towards the peace that would offer us all the possibility to continue
believing that everything was useful and that Manhasset, as was the
case with Houston in the past, was useful, because it opened new
possibilities for a just and lasting peace that is in keeping with
international legality.
Thank you!
INTERVENCION DEL SR. MAHFUD ALI BEIBA
Jefe de la delegación del F.
Polisario
Manhasset-Cuarta ronda
17 de marzo 2008
Su Excelencia Sr. Peter Van Walsum,
Enviado Personal del Secretario General de la ONU para el Sahara
occidental,
Sr. Julian Hartson, Representante Especial del Secretario General de la
ONU para el Sahara occidental,
Sras. y Sres. Miembros de la delegación de la ONU,
Sres. Miembros de la delegación de Marruecos,
Sres. Miembros de las delegaciones de los países vecinos,
Argelia y Mauritania
Sr. Enviado Personal,
Nos reunimos aquí de nuevo en Manhasset bajo sus auspicios en el
marco estipulado por las resoluciones 1754 y 1783 por medio de
las cuales el Consejo de seguridad pidió al Frente
POLISARIO y a Marruecos entablar negociaciones de buena fe para el
logro de una solución pacifica al conflicto que asegure el
derecho del pueblo saharaui a la autodeterminación.
Como ya habíamos tenido ocasión de recordarlo en
Manhasset I, Marruecos se había comprometido al respeto y la
aplicación de este derecho fundamental hasta que en 1975
decidió invadir y ocupar por la fuerza nuestro país en
1975 en el marco de un proyecto de expansión territorial del que
otros países en nuestra región fueron ya blancos directos.
Nuestro pueblo fue, desde ese año, victima de una guerra de
exterminio donde se utilizó el NAPALM el fósforo blanco,
una guerra que continua todavía a través de una
política de violación de derechos humanos que condujo
a centenares de desparecidos, civiles y militares, detenciones
arbitrarias y torturas, que se ejecuta en medio de la impunidad
que ofrece el cerco informativo al territorio.
Somos un pueblo que demostró determinación y voluntad
política para resistir y continuar su resistencia hasta el logro
pleno, hoy o mañana, de su legítimo derecho a la
autodeterminación e independencia.
Sin embargo, nunca hemos escatimado esfuerzos para dar posibilidades
tangibles a una solución pacifica al conflicto que nos fue
impuesto por la fuerza, tras la retirada de la potencia colonial
europea, por un vecino del que esperábamos apoyo y solidaridad.
En 1991, al aceptar el Plan de arreglo por el que el Consejo
envió a la MINURSO al territorio, Marruecos pareció
retornar a la razón y al compromiso original de dejar en manos
del pueblo saharaui el decidir libremente su futuro, optando por la
independencia o la integración a ese país en el marco de
un referéndum de autodeterminación organizado y
supervisado por las Naciones Unidas en cooperación con la
Organización para Unidad Africana.
Marruecos, a pesar de las obstrucciones emplazadas en el proceso de
identificación de votantes, volvió a reafirmar de
forma inequívoca a James Baker, Enviado Personal del Secretario
General, su compromiso con el proceso referendario (S/1997/882 de 13 de
noviembre de 1997). Los acuerdos de Houston que Marruecos aceptó
y el Consejo endosó, detallan de forma pormenorizada todos los
pasos que han de ser dados hasta la proclamación de los
resultados del referéndum de autodeterminación.
Todo estaba listo para el logro de una paz justa y duradera. Pero
y como lo reafirma James Baker en agosto del 2004, Marruecos
decidió “que ya no quería seguir adelante con el
proceso”, continuando así con una política marcada por la
falta del incumplimiento de sus obligaciones y por su indiferencia
hacia la legalidad internacional.
El proceso conducente a la consulta fue suspendido hasta ahora por la
decisión unilateral de Marruecos, y no por una supuesta
“inviabilidad” del mismo o por una incapacidad de la ONU de culminar
dicho proceso como pretende Marruecos.
La delegación del Frente POLISARIO está firmemente
convencida de que el proceso referendario puede y debe ser reactivado
siguiendo las pautas y fases claramente detalladas en el plan de
arreglo, en los acuerdos de Houston y en el Plan Baker, los
cuales no pueden ser arrojados a la papelera de la historia por
una decisión ligera e irracional de mal humor.
Esos acuerdos relejan una gran y única convergencia entre las
partes y entre éstas y la ONU para la solución justa y
duradera del conflicto. Intentar forzar la elaboración de un
nuevo marco de solución sobre todo contrario al
espíritu, a la letra y al objetivo de los acuerdos de paz
anteriormente aceptados y endosados por el Consejo es una tentativa a
la que el Frente POLISARIO y con toda seguridad las Naciones Unidas, la
región y África, no pueden asociarse ni caucionar.
En efecto, el Secretario General y su Enviado Personal dejaron
constancia inequívoca del hecho de que “la ONU no podrían
patrocinar un plan que excluyera un referéndum con la
independencia como una de sus opciones al mismo tiempo que reafirmara
que previa la libre determinación del pueblo del Sahara
occidental”. (S/2006/817, del 16 de octubre 2006; para 14)
Igualmente, la posición asumida desde hace mas de 20 años
por la Organización para la Unidad Africana (hoy la Unión
Africana) y por la mayoría de los países de la
región nor-occidental del continente sobre la cuestión
saharaui no deja lugar a dudas sobre los principios que deben guiar
toda búsqueda de una paz justa y duradera.
Hay pues principios de derecho internacional esenciales para la ONU
así como posiciones y hechos que han resistido el paso del
tiempo y su fuerza ha desmentido las esperanzas albergadas por la otra
parte sobre la pérdida de su consistencia y valor.
Es en base a lo anterior que hemos saludado la oportunidad abierta en
abril 2007 por la resolución 1754 del Consejo de Seguridad y
hemos participado, de buena fe, en el proceso de de
negociación de Manhasset.
Desafortunadamente, como hemos visto en su injustificado rechazo al
Plan Baker, su obstrucción a la aplicación de los
acuerdos de Houston y del Plan de arreglo y como hemos constatado en
las anteriores rondas, Marruecos no da señales de haber
comprendido el mensaje e insiste en una llamada propuesta que incluye
una única opción que pretende legitimar un proyecto
expansionista anacrónico, que viola la Carta de la ONU y ignora
los términos de referencia establecidos por la comunidad
internacional para resolver el conflicto del Sahara occidental.
Queremos pues, Sr. Enviado Personal, dejar constancia ante Usted y ante
la delegación marroquí con el pedido formal de que
así sea trasladado al conocimiento del Secretario General y del
Consejo de Seguridad lo siguiente:
1. El Frente POLISARIO está dispuesto a cooperar en la
aplicación rigurosa de las dos resoluciones del Consejo de
Seguridad que reafirman la validez y vigencia del principio de
autodeterminación para el pueblo de un territorio que sigue
estando en la lista del Comité Especial de
Descolonización treinta y tres años después de la
retirada de la potencia colonial europea. La ONU no le reconoce a la
potencia ocupante actual ni la soberanía ni siquiera la
condición de potencia administradora, como afirma el dictamen
del departamento jurídico de la ONU del 29 de enero de 2002:
2.- Nuestra visón sobre la aplicabilidad de esas resoluciones es
muy conocida. Creemos que las negociaciones de Manhasset, como ayer las
de Houston, Londres y Lisboa, tienen como objetivo asegurar la
aplicación—y no la negación—del derecho a la libre
determinación en los términos establecidos por la
comunidad internacional en la resolución 1514 (XV) de la
Asamblea general.
Nuestra visión es flexible y amplia, porque incluye todas las
opciones para un referéndum de autodeterminación en
conformidad con esa resolución. Se trata de dejar en manos del
pueblo saharaui la decisión final sobre su futuro. Ningún
país serio ni ninguna organización internacional con un
mínimo de credibilidad podrían oponerse a este principio.
3. Las dos partes deben cooperar para facilitar a la ONU el finalizar
la última fase del proceso refrendario teniendo en cuenta las
recientes propuestas y la parte del camino ya allanada por la ONU para
llegar a la proclamación de los resultados del voto
referendario.
4. Nuestra posición estriba, en síntesis, en dejar en
manos de la ONU la responsabilidad de culminar ese proceso preguntando
al pueblo saharaui que es lo que quiere para su futuro. No prejuzgamos
nada ni queremos imponer nada. Queremos que el pueblo saharaui tenga la
posibilidad de ir a las urnas, a la vía pacifica para poner fin
a este largo conflicto cuya prolongación no beneficia a la
credibilidad de la ONU, a la seguridad y estabilidad de la
región ni al desarrollo de los pueblos de la región.
5. Es también en el marco de nuestra voluntad de contribuir al
éxito de este proceso que la delegación del POLISARIO
aceptó, y sigue aceptando, considerar de manera positiva la
cuestión de las medidas de fomento de confianza que Usted
había propuesto en la segunda ronda de negociaciones. Hay
también el tema altamente sensible del respeto a los derechos
humanos en el territorio que Usted mismo, Señor Enviado
personal, consideró “probablemente la mejor de las medidas
de fomento de confianza”, subrayando que “sería irrealista
alcanzar una solución mutuamente aceptable sin abordar la
cuestión de los derechos humanos en el contexto de nuestras
negociaciones”. No podemos sino lamentar que Marruecos dijera que no
estaba dispuesto a considerar esta materia en el contexto de las
rondas anteriores de negociación.
Aunque el Consejo de Seguridad nos llamó, en su
resolución 1783 (2007), “que sigamos dando muestras de voluntad
política y trabajemos en una atmósfera propicia para el
diálogo”, Marruecos sigue perpetrando graves violaciones de
derechos humanos en las zonas ocupadas, y oponiéndose a un
derecho humano fundamental, a saber el derecho a la
autodeterminación.
6. Marruecos tiene desde 2004 su propia y sorprendente versión
de ese derecho. En realidad se opone a dicho derecho al limitarlo de
forma indebida a una sola opción de manera que viola el
espíritu y la letra de la resolución 1514 (XV) de la
Asamblea General, que estipula que el derecho a la libre
determinación debe ejercerse conforme a la voluntad y el deseo
expresados libremente por el pueblo en cuestión.
La delegación marroquí vino a Manhasset para reiterar que
esta dispuesta a negociar solo la solución que le reconozca de
antemano la “marroquinidad” del Sahara occidental. Esta posición
pre-condiciona y prejuzga el resultado de las negociaciones.
Nadie puede llamarla negociación; se trata más bien de
imposición. También confunde autodeterminación con
anexión forzosa. Además, Marruecos alegó en el
pasado la imposibilidad práctica de celebrar una consulta
referendaria pero al mismo tiempo considera que su llamada propuesta de
solución permite dicha consulta.
Vemos pues una posición insostenible desde el punto de vista de
los principios básicos de la Carta de la ONU y de los
términos de referencia establecidos por el Consejo de Seguridad
desde el día de su implicación en el proceso de
solución. Vemos también una “demarche” que revela
contradicciones elementales respecto a la pertinencia y viabilidad de
una consulta referendaria, que para Marruecos es inviable si la
opción incluye la independencia y viable si la única
opción es la llamada autonomía.
Como todos los anteriores planes de paz aprobados por el Consejo de
Seguridad, el Frente POLISARIO considera que la consulta es posible y
ha de hacerse con al menos dos opciones.
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